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Abstract 
We build an Asymmetric Spatial Error Correction Model (ASpECM) to investigate 
the role of spatial dependence at the retail gasoline price adjustment mechanism. We 
find evidence that the symmetric price pattern is fully reversed when we account for 
spatial spillover effects, indicating that retail prices adjust more rapidly in an upward 
than a downward direction. This finding raises the possibility that retailers are more 
likely to engage in anti-competitive practices which may be ignored when the 
regulators bypass the role of spatial dependence.  
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1. Introduction  
 
Within the last years there is a plethora of studies examining the existence and the 
causes of gasoline price asymmetry with controversial results (Borenstein et al., 1997; 
Galeotti et al., 2003; Deltas, 2008; Greenwood-Nimmo and Shin, 2013, Remer, 2015).  
 
Despite the rich body of literature, existing studies suffer from three major limitations. 
First, they assume that asymmetric price responsiveness is space invariant. However, 
this is a rather strong assumption that has to be tested rather than assumed in order to 
avoid biased results. Second and most importantly, all of the existing studies ignore 
the role of “localized competition” between petrol stations and possible spatial 
spillover effects which in our model act as a driving force to uncover asymmetric 
price movements. Specifically, Chamberlin (1948) was the first who resembled the 
gasoline market as a prototype for what he called „localized competition‟. Slade 
(1992) has also pointed out that at the retail level, consumers face transportation 
(time) costs when switching between gasoline stations. Therefore, the gasoline 
station's location introduces spatial differentiation into a homogeneous product market 
(Firgo et al., 2015). Thirdly, much of the empirical literature has worked with 
monthly/weekly data. These datasets have many drawbacks (i.e., less information, 
inconsistency) since the use of monthly or weekly averages takes away much price 
variation. Similarly to Remer (2015), we deal with this issue by using daily data. The 
rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the empirical 
model. Section 3 discusses the empirical findings, while Section 4 concludes the 
paper. 
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2. The Asymmetric Spatial Error Correction Model (ASpECM) 
 
Extending Beenstock and Felsenstein (2010), the ASpECM is built around a simple 
long-run relationship of the form:  
ititititiit uSPGNRPGSPGNRPG 
*
3
*
210        (1) 
where NRPGit is the natural logarithm of the retail price of regular gasoline net of 
taxes and duties; SPGit is the natural logarithm of the spot gasoline (wholesale) price, 
i0  and itu  denote the cross-section fixed effects and the error term, respectively and 
superscript „*‟ denotes a spatially lagged variable defined as ht
N
ih
ihit xwx 

*  for 
NRPGSPGx , where N is the number of spatial units and ihw are row-summed 
spatial weights with 1i ihw . The matrix 0ihw if i = h or if i ≠ h and the driving 
distance between spatial units i and h is more than 8.58 km. If the distance is less or 
equal to 8.58 km, then 1ihw . Our distance threshold value is calculated by using the 
speed of the average driver and the fact that a travel time of more than ten minutes is 
not a good basis for assessing local competition between gasoline stations (OECD, 
2011).
1
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 However, we use for robustness check possible other spatial weights (i.e., +/-1% of 8.58 km) with 
similar results.  
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where t denotes the time dimension and i identifies the spatial units; ia  denotes the 
spatial specific effect and it  is the usual random i.i.d. error term;   is the first 
difference operator and the orders k, l, p, q, m, s represent the number of lagged terms. 
}0,max{ 1
  ititit yyy  and }0,min{ 1
  ititit yyy  for ECMSPGy , , superscript 
„*‟ denotes a spatially lagged variable defined as above for ECMNRPGSPGx ,, . 
Lastly, itECM  denotes the error correction term. The coefficients in  (1) and (2) are 
estimated by a fixed effects estimator
2
. 
 
3. Estimation results and discussion  
The econometric estimation was based on a panel of seven municipalities in the 
Hudson County of New Jersey (NJ) covering the period from January 2012 to 
December 2015 (see Figure 1). 
3
  The choice of the geographical area is based on the 
fact that NJ is the second State with the highest number of gasoline stations per square 
kilometer, pointing out possible spatial dependence.   
[Insert Figure 1] 
We use a daily dataset of 10.199 observations. All price variables constitute daily 
averages for each one of the petrol stations located on the seven municipalities and are 
taken from the Oil Pricing Information Service (OPIS). Figure 2 depicts the relatively 
close co-movement between the wholesale and retail gasoline prices during the 
sample period.  
[Insert Figure 2] 
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 The presence of a very large T (1457) justifies the Least Squares Dummy Variable Estimator (Judson 
and Owen, 1999).  
3
  These include Bayonne, Kearny, North Bergen, Weehawken, Union City, Secaucus and Jersey City. 
The rest of the municipalities were not included due to missing data.  
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We carry out the first part of the empirical analysis by examining the presence of 
cross-sectional dependence (Pesaran, 2004). The test statistic rejects the null 
hypothesis (p-value = 0.000), indicating that price variables exhibit cross-sectional 
(spatial) dependence. In the next stage, we employ unit root tests. The results support 
the presence of a unit root (see Table 1, Panel A). The next step is to check for the 
existence of long-run relationship. According to Pedroni‟s (1999) panel cointegration 
test statistics, it is evident that all four tests reject the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration in the ECM (non-spatial model) and the ASpECM, respectively (see 
Panel B). 
[Insert Table 1] 
Table 2 depicts the empirical findings. 4 Examining the non-spatial model, it is evident 
that wholesale positive coefficient is larger than its negative counterpart, indicating 
that the effects of upstream price increases are larger than those of price decreases. 
The coefficients λ+ and λ- indicate the asymmetric adjustment speed. From the 
reported values, we argue that the speed of adjustment ranges from 3.1%-11.4% per 
day with negative changes of the error correction term being larger (in absolute 
value), than the positive ones. This means that if the retail price is 10% above its long-
run equilibrium, only 0.3% of the difference between the equilibrium and the current 
price will be eliminated in the next day. We find no evidence of price asymmetry, 
since the Wald test cannot reject the null hypothesis, while the reverse holds for the 
existence of long-run asymmetry. If we try to compare the two models, some 
interesting remarks emerge. First, in the ASpECM, we find a positive (λ*+) and 
negative (λ*-) long-run coefficient equal to -0.127 and -0.053 respectively, indicating 
                                                          
4
 We have also estimated the two models using time dummies to control for seasonal effects. The 
estimation results are qualitatively similar in both cases.       
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that retailers are driven by the fluctuations in the input price of gasoline. This result 
reveals a long-run rent-seeking oligopolistic pricing behaviour by the retailers, which 
in turns is consistent with an asymmetric price adjustment mechanism. This is also 
confirmed by the rejection of the null hypothesis (   **0 : H ) giving strong 
theoretical evidence that spatial asymmetric price adjustment can be attributed to the 
oligopolistic pricing behavior (Radchenko, 2005). Secondly, the empirical findings of 
the ASpECM indicate the existence of short-run asymmetric pricing scheme not 
captured by the ECM since the two Wald tests reject the null. Lastly, the existence of 
long-run asymmetry in the non-spatial model  is strongly biased since the Wald test 
cannot reject the null in the ASpECM when we do account for spatial dependence (p-
value = 0.817). Lastly, the diagnostics confirm the absence of serial dependence and 
the joint statistical significance of the estimated coefficients.       
[Insert Table 2] 
4.  Concluding remarks  
Using the ASpECM framework, we have found strong evidence suggesting the 
validity of the “rockets and feathers” hypothesis. The oligopolistic structure of the 
local gasoline market along with spatial dependence, trigger the price asymmetric 
adjustment path. This finding raises serious doubts on the existence of a rent seeking 
oligopolistic behavior by petrol stations. The difference in the existence of 
asymmetric pass-through suggests that empirical studies that ignore the role of spatial 
dependence and local competition may miss an important element of the nature of 
price adjustment in the retail gasoline industry thus providing the wrong signal to 
regulators.    
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Figure 1: Hudson County municipalities 
 
Source: State of New Jersey Department of State 
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Figure 2: Price evolution (Jan 2012-Dec 2015)   
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Source: OPIS Retail Data House 
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Table 1: Panel unit root and co-integration tests 
Panel A: Unit root tests 
Variable IPS test  Breitung test 
 W-t-bar p-value  lambda p-value 
NRPG 0.113 0.545  0.509 0.695 
SPG 2.227 0.987  0.530 0.702 
ΔNRPG -21.930*** 0.000  -12.366*** 0.000 
ΔSPG -1.2e+02*** 0.000  -9.977*** 0.000 
Panel B: Co-integration tests 
 ECM   ASpECM  
Statistic    
panel-ρ statistic -109.6***  -91.98*** 
panel-t statistic -32.97
***
  -34.87
***
 
group-ρ statistic -120.8***  -118.6*** 
group-t statistic -37.72
***
  -42.76
***
 
Notes: 
***,
 indicate significance at the 1% level. For the Im–Pesaran–Shin (IPS) test, the optimal lag 
length was chosen by the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). Breitung‟s lambda is robust to cross-
sectional dependence.  
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Table 2: Empirical results  
Estimated coefficients                                    ECM                                                 ASpECM 

0  
0.070
***
 
(0.010) 
0.001 
(0.019) 

0  
0.063
***
 
(0.009) 
0.068
***
 
(0.018) 
*
0  - 
0.073
***
 
(0.022) 
*
0  - 
0.010 
(0.020) 
  
-0.031
***
 
(0.004) 
-0.084
***
 
(0.005) 
  
-0.114
***
 
(0.004) 
-0.086
***
 
(0.006) 
*  - 
-0.127
***
 
(0.016) 
*  - 
-0.053
***
 
(0.011) 
Symmetry tests 
  000 : H  
0.19 
[0.659] 
5.54
**
 
[0.019] 
  *0
*
00 : H  - 
3.66
*
 
[0.056] 
  :0H  
146.82
***
 
[0.000] 
0.05 
[0.817] 
  **0 : H  - 
10.21
***
 
[0.001] 
Diagnostics 
Wald‟s  joint test 
3440.80
***
  
[0.000] 
3192.02
***
  
[0.000] 
Autocorrelation of 
residuals test 
0.001 
[0.972] 
0.050 
[0.830] 
Notes: 
***
, 
**
 and 
* 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Superscript „*‟ in δ and λ denotes 
spatially lagged variables. Standard errors (p-values) are reported in parentheses (square brackets). The ECM and the 
ASpECM are estimated with Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) with cross-sectional fixed effects, correcting for 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. The constant term is not statistically significant. The lag length is determined using 
a recursive procedure based on the value of the t-statistic of the last lag for each coefficient. The autocorrelation test is 
based on Wooldridge (2002).  
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